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Singapore: A Model of Urban
Environmentalism in Southeast Asia
By BRIAN C. SMrrH
Member of the Class of 1993
Contrary to the beautiful photos gracing the covers of countless re-
gional travel magazines and postcards, the environmental reality of
Southeast Asia is not a pretty picture, and the future may be even
bleaker. When arriving in a typical Southeast Asian city, one immedi-
ately witnesses congestion and chaos. Not far from the tourist-infested
beaches, one readily finds trash, raw sewage, and burning embers where
prehistoric rainforest once stood. Southeast Asia is home to some of the
world's most beautiful resorts and to cities blanketed in filth and smog,
such as Bangkok, perhaps the world's best example of an urban environ-
mental nightmare. Many of these conditions are the direct result of de-
velopment and progress in one of the world's fastest growing regions.
In the midst of this turmoil, however, lies the island nation of Singa-
pore, the "Garden City." Singapore is in many ways a testament to de-
velopment done right. Singapore's example provides a measure of
optimism to those justifiably concerned with avoiding an environmental
holocaust in one of the world's most vital regions. Though better known
for its hotels, shopping malls, and national airline, Singapore provides a
noteworthy example of the successful integration of industrial growth
and environmental planning and management. The recent visit by
George Bush to Singapore, the first by a United States President,' illus-
trates Singapore's rising importance on the world scene. An independent
nation since only 1965,2 Singapore developed rapidly into a highly indus-
trialized society with the highest standard of living in all of Southeast
Asia.'
During the industrialization process, which transformed the island
1. U.S. Gets Singapore O.K for Naval Base, C-I. TRIB., Jan. 5, 1992, at 8.
2. Peter S.1. Chen, Development and Environmental Planning in Singapore, in ENvIRO.N-
MENTAL LAW AND POLICY IN THE PACIFIC BASIN AREA 23 (Ichiro Kato et a]. eds., 1981).
3. See Southeast Asia: The Filth of Wealth, Inter Press Service, Feb. 7, 1990, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, AsiaPc File.
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nation from a tropical forest to the world's busiest port,4 the Singaporean
government carefully addressed the potentially adverse environmental ef-
fects of rapid growth.' More recently, Singapore has begun to establish
itself as both a regional leader6 and an international participant 7 in envi-
ronmental affairs. In 1971 Singapore developed the first Concept Plan, a
long range comprehensive land use and physical development blueprint
for all of Singapore.' This plan terminated in 1992. Thus, now is an
appropriate time to assess Singapore's environmental efforts during its
industrialized development.
This Note first presents a general background necessary for under-
standing the impetus behind Singapore's environmental movement. Sec-
ond, this Note analyzes Singapore's domestic environmental control
efforts, focusing on legislation, treaties, and informal action taken pursu-
ant to broad governmental policies. Third, this Note analyzes Associa-
tion of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and regional environmental
control efforts. Finally, this Note discusses practical ways for Singapore
to remedy its shortcomings and recommends appropriate steps for Singa-
pore to take to further its environmental goals.
I. BACKGROUND
Located at the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula about 1500 miles
south of China, Singapore consists of a main island and fifty-eight small
islets totalling 636 square kilometers.9 Its diminutive size, exacerbated
by a dense population exceeding 2.6 million people,10 demanded atten-
tion be paid to the environment and its limited natural resources from
the outset.11 The immediate attention proved a blessing for Singapore,
however, because it prevented an accumulation of the environmental ills
only recently addressed by the majority of Southeast Asia. 12
The stability of Singapore's administrative framework has facilitated
4. Industry, Construction, Transport, Communications News: Output, Bus. Int'l Country
Rep., Mar. 28, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AsiaPc File.
5. Chen, supra note 2, at 25.
6. See Singapore "Green" Campaign to Hit Overdrive, The Reuter Library Report, Nov.
7, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AsiaPc File.
7. "Green" Good for Business, Asian Executives Told, The Reuter Library Report, Nov.
10, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AsiaPc File.
8. Chen, supra note 2, at 27.
9. FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, SINGAPORE: A COUNTRY
STUDY xiii-xiv, 68 (Barbara L. LePoer ed., 2d ed. 1991).
10. Id. at 70.
11. Carbon Dioxide Emission Cuts Could Be Costly for Japan, Daily Report for Execu-
tives, Mar. 21, 1990, at A4, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AsiaPc File.
12. Singapore "Green" Campaign to Hit Overdrive, supra note 6.
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concentrated attention to environmental concerns. Due to a constitu-
tionally proscribed parliamentary system of government,' 3 and the ab-
sence of any significant opposition to authority, Singapore has been able
to avoid the type of political turmoil frequently seen in neighboring Thai-
land and the Philippines. This lends consistency and predictability to the
pursuit of environmentally-conscious development.
Supreme legislative power resides in Singapore's unicameral and
popularly elected Parliament. 4 Parliament, in turn, elects a President as
the chief executive of Singapore. In truth, however, executive authority
in Singapore also resides in the parliament. The President is largely a
figurehead 5 who vests authority in Cabinet appointees, including the
Prime Minister and other Ministers.' 6 In appointing the Prime Minister,
the President must select a member of Parliament who commands the
confidence of a majority of its members.'" The President then appoints
Cabinet members under the Prime Minister's advice.'8 Cabinet appoint-
ments are revocable, and the Prime Minister may be removed if he loses
majority support in Parliament. 19 Therefore, the government is essen-
tially unified into one body, Parliament, charged with both enacting and
enforcing law. This union provides consistent goals and methods of pur-
suing environmentally-conscious development.
The lack of any substantial governmental opposition in Singapore
adds to administrative stability and effectiveness. The People's Action
Party (PAP) has monopolized Parliament for over twenty years.20 Fol-
lowing the most recent general elections, the PAP held eighty of the
eighty-one seats in Parliament."' Additionally, Lee Kuan Yew, currently
a senior minister, ruled as Prime Minister for over twenty years before
passing the gavel to Goh Chok Teng in 1990. With consistent leadership,
unburdened by political posturing or pandering to the public for electoral
support, Parliament can focus on effective administration rather than
politics. To satisfy growing public demand for some opposition as a
check on unbridled governmental control, the Constitution was amended
in 1984 to provide seats for members of opposition parties winning at
13. SING. CONST. arts. 38-67.
14. Id. art. 38.
15. See id. art. 21.
16. Id. art. 23(l).
17. Id. art. 25.
18. Id. art. 25(1).
19. Id. art. 26(1)(b)-(2).
20. HELENA H.M. CHAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SINGAPORE LEGAL SYSTFM 43-
44 (1986).
21. PRICE WATERHOUSE, INC., DOING BUSINESS IN SINGAPORE 2 (1990).
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least fifteen percent of the vote.22 However, a maximum of three "Non
Constituency" members may be chosen, and they have limited voting
rights.
23
Though many view such centralized authority as threatening, the
Singaporeans, who are mainly of Chinese descent, welcome it.24 Sin-
gaporeans traditionally observe a Confucian respect for law and author-
ity.25 Commentators attribute this to a cultural tolerance of, if not a
preference for, a strong, paternalistic government.26 Furthermore, in the
Chinese tradition, litigation is an undesirable method of settling disputes,
especially those involving authority figures.27 Individuals and industries
are unlikely to challenge governmental policies or regulations, thus re-
moving another potential hurdle from the course of environmentally-
conscious development.
II. DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL EFFORTS
Environmental success in Singapore has resulted from a unique
combination of governmental legislation and social action. Experiencing
rapid growth since only 1968, Singapore got a late start in the develop-
ment process. 2 By learning from others' mistakes, the Singaporean gov-
ernment incorporated environmental concerns with development
strategies from its beginning.
A. Planning and Legislation
The Concept Plan ("Plan") provides the foundation of comprehen-
sive environmental control in Singapore. Originally projected to 1992,
the Plan provides broad guidelines for overall planning and policy for
urban and environmental developments.29 It organizes a system of pre-
dominant land uses, with separate areas for commerce, industry, and res-
idential life, and connects each area by a series of transportation links.3
The Plan is designed to prevent many environmental problems, primarily
overdevelopment and congestion. However, since the government usu-
22. See SING. CONST. (Amendment) Act 1984, No. 16 of 1984, § 4.
23. Id.
24. SINGAPORE: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 9, at 78.
25. Chan, supra note 20, at 133.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 134.
28. Chen, supra note 2, at 31.
29. Id. at 28.
30. Id.
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ally refuses to engage in detailed centralized planning,3" many gaps were
left to be filled by specific legislation.
The first step towards filling the gaps in the Plan was the Prime
Minister's establishment of the Anti-Pollution Unit (Unit) in 1970.32
The Prime Minister charged the Unit with identifying pollution
problems, suggesting solutions, formulating policy, and drafting legisla-
tion.33 Since 1970, Singapore has enacted significant legislation address-
ing air pollution, water pollution,3 ' and hazardous chemicals.35
Additionally, the Singaporean government formulated a series of incen-
tives promoting the technological advancement of industrial practices.36
Legislation since 1970 shows substantial progress, but simultaneously
reveals the government's tendency to accommodate industry while
strictly regulating individual behavior.
1. Air Pollution
Air pollution legislation is an early example of Singapore's tendency
to accommodate industry over the individual. The Clean Air Act was
adopted in 1971 to combat air pollution, but was soon found inade-
quate.37 The amended Act provides more bite through strengthening
governmental control and imposing stricter penalties on offenders. 38 The
amendments grant government officials seemingly limitless discretion to
regulate industrial air pollution. The Act's provisions may apply to any
industrial or trade premises which, "in the opinion of the Director [of
enforcement]," are actually or are likely to be emitting air impurities.39
This mandate clearly gives the government considerable latitude to keep
industry in line with environmental policies. In fact, the Act subjects
factories and businesses that emit air impurities to numerous remedial
measures. The Director has discretion to require industries to alter or
replace any fuel-burning or control equipment, to change their methods
of operation, to use a specified type of fuel, or even to entirely dismantle
an industrial plant.4 The Director places premises emitting a specified
31. Singapore" Overseas Business Report, National Trade Data Bank Market Reports, June
12, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AsiaPc File [hereinafter Business Report].
32. Chen, supra note 2, at 31.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 32-34.
35. Controls Tightened on Hazardous Chemicals, F. Asian Exec. Rep., Dec. 15, 1985,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AsiaPc File.
36. Business Report, supra note 31.
37. See Chen, supra note 2, at 33.
38. Id.
39. Clean Air Act, § 5(1) (Sing. 1971) (amended 1975).
40. Id. § 5(a)(i-vii).
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pollutant at unsafe levels on a reductions schedule.41 The occupant may
not change equipment, fuel, or methods of operation without the Direc-
tor's written permission.42
Though the clean air statute provides the means to attack air pollu-
tion, it does not explicitly require the government to act. The phrase "if
in the opinion.., the Director may require ' 43 does not require govern-
ment action. The statute contains imperative language elsewhere, using
"shall not" to prohibit any alterations on scheduled premises." How-
ever, because the Director may legally decide whether to exempt given
premises from stricter measures, even the imperative "shall" has little
practical effect.
This ministerial discretion remains in effect under more recent air
pollution legislation in Singapore. Singapore is a participating country in
the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer (the
Protocol).45 This international treaty establishes controls over certain
substances, primarily chlorofiourocarbons (CFCs)," which aggravate the
greenhouse effect, and contribute to global warming.4 7 A commentator
claims that the Protocol marks a major step in environmental control
because it may jeopardize economic interests by setting firm target dates
for emissions reductions.4" Indeed, it is rife with imperative language.
Under the Protocol, Singapore must maintain consumption of controlled
substances at 1986 levels until 1993.19 Thereafter, it must reduce con-
sumption to eighty percent of 1986 levels by mid-1994 and to fifty per-
cent of 1986 levels by mid-1999. After 1999, Singapore must eliminate
the chemicals entirely.5
Currently, Singapore exceeds the Montreal Protocol's requirements
despite the severe costs imposed on many industries.5 CFC consump-
41. Id. § 6.
42. Id. § 6(1)(a).
43. Id. § 5.
44. Id. § 6.
45. See Singapore: Increased Environmental Concern, National Trade Data Bank Market
Reports, July 3, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AsiaPo File [hereinafter Environ.
mental Report].
46. Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, art. 1, § 4, opened
for signature Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989) [hereinafter Mon-
treal Protocol].
47. Richard E. Benedick, The Montreal Ozone Treaty: Implications For Global Warning,
5 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 227, 227 (1990).
48. See id. at 228.
49. Montreal Protocol, supra note 46, art. 2, § 1.
50. Id. art. 2, §§ 2-4.
51. See Environmental Report, supra note 45.
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tion has been reduced fifteen percent from 1986 levels, and, as of Febru-
ary 1991, the manufacture and import of products containing CFCs was
banned.12 CFC consumption is dominated by Singapore's extensive elec-
tronics industry, which uses CFCs as cleaning solvents. 3 Singapore reg-
ulates consumption through a quota system requiring firms operating in
Singapore to bid for a limited number of licenses authorizing CFC use.'
Unfortunately, Singapore's promising record for implementing Pro-
tocol goals may not continue. Speaking at a seminar addressing altema-
fives to CFC use, Singapore's Environment Minister Ahrad Mattar
openly expressed his doubts about the Nation's continued adherence to
Protocol timetables.5" He cited the lack of feasible alternatives and the
expense to industry as the reasons.56 Mattar specifically acknowledged
non-compliance with the Protocol's requirement that member parties
share research and technology in developing CFC substitutes.5 7 Because
the Protocol currently lacks procedures to combat non-compliance,
5
1
Singapore fails to enforce any relevant measures on its industries. Thus,
the Protocol's provisions are largely voluntary, despite its imperative lan-
guage. Moreover, there is no assurance that Singapore will continue its
impressive performance. Since compliance is expensive, continued com-
pliance is especially difficult in times of economic hardship.
2. Water Pollution
Singapore's impressive potential without accompanying enforce-
ment efforts in its air pollution regulation also exists in its water pollution
regulation. Given its small size and dense population, a clean water sup-
ply is crucial for Singapore. The government urges water conservation to
minimize dependence on water imported from Malaysia.5 9 Furthermore,
Singapore's limited land mass, coupled with its reliance on trade, de-
mands maintenance of relatively clean coastal waters.6°
52. Id
53. In ASEAN, Growth Comes Before Greenery, Business Asia, July 16, 1990, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, AsialPc File.
54. Singapore Changes How People Think, Business Asia, June 17, 1991, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, AsiaPe File.
55. Singapore Not Likely to Phase Out Use of CFC by 2000, Xinhua News Agency, Sept.
17, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AsiaPc File.
56. Id.
57. Montreal Protocol, supra note 46, art. 9, §§ 1-3.
58. Id art. 8.
59. SINGAPORE: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 9, at 69.
60. Henry Ong Wah Kim & Ng Cheng Siang, Development of Coastal Zones and Its Im-
pact on the EnvironmenL" The Singapore Experience, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND
COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 202 (Ichiro Kato et al. eds., 1985).
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The Water Pollution Control and Drainage Act vests jurisdiction in
the Minister of Environment to regulate the water quality of "any water-
course, river, reservoir, lake or pond."61 However, the Act's provisions
exempt government land, buildings, and installations controlled by the
Public Utilities Board.62 Furthermore, the Act imposes no affirmative
duty on the Minister to control water quality or to establish necessary
regulations.63 When the Minister chooses to regulate a particular party,
however, the Act's restrictions are quite broad. Any person who causes
the discharge of "any oil, chemical, sewage, trade effluent, or any noxious
or polluting matter" into the waterways is liable under the Act.' A lia-
ble party must treat trade effluent and dispose of it with the Director's
written permission.65 Additionally, the Act requires any person suffering
from or causing such discharge, whether wilfully or accidentally, to in-
form the Director.66 The Director imposes mandatory fines on convicted
polluters and on those who fail to report discharges. 67 These fines in-
crease substantially with each subsequent conviction. 6
Some provisions of the Water Pollution Control and Drainage Act
are troublesome. Section 17 of the Act explicitly authorizes the Director
to allow public sewage dumping into the sea, either at the most conve-
nient site, or by the most expedient means, so long as a nuisance does not
develop. 69 This provision conflicts with several provisions of the Preven-
tion of the Pollution of the Sea Act,70 which parallels the Water Pollu-
tion Control and Drainage Act but applies to vessels or any land-based
facilities which discharge into coastal waters. 7' This distinction between
sewage and other forms of water pollution is meaningless from an envi-
ronmental standpoint; rather, it highlights the limits of Singapore's envi-
ronmental progress to date. Other than ocean dumping, no feasible
method exists for disposing the admittedly enormous amounts of public
sewage. Additionally, the Water Pollution Control and Drainage Act
contains numerous provisions granting discretion to the Director, which
effectively relieves him of his duty to enforce it. For example, the Act
61. Water Pollution Control and Drainage Act, pt. 4, § 14(1) (Sing. 1975).
62. Id. pt. 4, § 13(6).
63. Id. pt. 4, § 14(1).
64. Id. pt. 4, § 14(2).
65. Id. pt. 5, § 30(1).
66. Id. pt. 4, § 14(3).
67. Id. pt. 4, § 14(4).
68. Id.
69. Id. pt. 5, § 17.
70. Civil Liability (Oil Pollution) Act, § 13 (Sing. 1973).
71. Nobuo Kumamoto, Coastal Zone Management in Asia and the Pacific, in ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION AND COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT, supra note 60, at 69.
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grants the Director discretion to independently determine whether a dis-
charge is substantial enough to merit prosecution, rather than mandating
utilization of set limits. Furthermore, it allows the Director to "either
permanently or for such [time] as he sees fit, exempt any person or prem-
ises from any of the provisions of this act."'72 These provisions poten-
tially provide significant accommodation to business interests at the
environment's expense.
B. Business Incentive Programs
Singapore hopes to repeat Japan's performance of the 1950s and
1960s, when the economy survived unscathed despite multi-billion dollar
environmental spending by industry to remedy mercury poisoning and
air pollution disasters.73 This feat demonstrated that both industrial
growth and some measure of environmental protection can be achieved
by placing the burden of environmental spending on industry rather than
on the government. To accomplish these twin aims, the Singaporean
government supplements pollution legislation with numerous incentives
providing benefits to businesses that engage in environmentally prudent
behavior. Additionally, assurances that "concern for the environment is
good for the corporate image and good for your bottom line"'74 help per-
suade firms to share the burden of environmentalism without the added
"encouragement" of further pollution specific legislation. The incentive
system comports with governmental policies favoring self-regulation and
voluntary response to incentives by business and industry over detailed,
inflexible central planning. Ideally, the use of incentives, rather than for-
mal laws, will serve the best interests of both business and government.
These incentives derive from the Economic Incentives Act, passed in
1967 to attract industries to Singapore. 5
Singapore's incentive programs under the Economic Incentives Act
in the areas of investment, research and development (R&D), and inter-
national consultancy are particularly relevant to the growth of environ-
mentalism, though they are not limited to environmental projects. The
government does not employ a formal screening mechanism to determine
eligibility; rather, it offers incentives on an ad hoc basis.7 6 The govern-
ment is highly selective, exclusively promoting industries which fit its
72. Water Pollution Control and Drainage Act, pt. 6, § 66.
73. "Green" Good for Business Asian Executives Told, supra note 7.
74. Id. (quoting Tommy Roh, Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development).
75. Chen, supra note 2, at 24.
76. Business Report, supra note 31.
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overall development strategy." Currently, the industries most likely eli-
gible for incentives are electronics, petroleum, and waste disposal.78
1. Investment Incentives
Investment incentives consist of tax exemptions or reductions.
Under the Pioneer Status exemption, manufacturers' profits may be ex-
empt from taxation for five to ten years, if their particular manufacturing
efforts contribute sufficiently to Singapore's growth and if they can main-
tain consistently high investment levels over the course of four to five
years.79 Conceivably, investment in a plant which manufactures chemi-
cals to replace CFCs in the electronics industry could be eligible for Pio-
neer Status. These requirements, and those of other incentive programs
are ambiguous,80 providing the Economic Development Board wide lati-
tude in determining eligibility.
Companies engaging in specialized engineering services, research, or
construction may qualify for investment allowances, allowing them to
deduct up to fifty percent of capital expenditures.81 There is no pre-
scribed minimum level of capital investment, but the investment must be
made within five years. 2 Thus, the government promotes projects with
immediate impacts rather than those with marginal, drawn-out effects.
Currently, such a project is underway to ease traffic congestion on the
Central Expressway. 3 Firms with the requisite technical expertise are
bidding on a project for an underground road network to increase traffic
flow,84 lessening air pollution by getting cars and their exhaust off the
roads more quickly.
2. Research and Development Incentives
Singapore offers numerous incentives to manufacturers engaging in
research and development (R&D). Companies which collaborate with
public institutions on nationally and technologically significant R&D
projects are eligible for substantial government funding.85 Similarly, the
government has agreed to fund the establishment of the National Insti-
77. Id.
78. DOING BUSINESS IN SINGAPORE, supra note 21, at 16-17.




83. Proposals for Underground Road Studied in Singapore, Xinhua News Service, Dcc. 22,
1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AsiaPc File.
84. Id.
85. Business Report, supra note 31.
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tute of Environmental Technology.86 Companies may also be considered
for an extension of their Pioneer Status through participation in R&D,
even if their research is not otherwise innovative."7 Additionally, compa-
nies may depreciate their plants and machinery over three years and their
buildings over twenty-five years.88
The R&D incentives play an important role in addressing Singa-
pore's growing waste disposal problems. Singapore's waste problems are
particularly acute since Singapore produces up to sixty percent more gar-
bage per capita than other industrialized nations.8 9 Firms responded
with trash incinerators capable of burning ninety percent of Singapore's
rubbish by 1994 and by turning hazardous industrial waste to harmless
ash.' Between one and two percent of the Public Utilities Board's power
is generated by turbines driven by these waste incinerators.9"
3. International Services Incentives
Singapore offers international consultancy incentives to companies
engaged in technical advisory services, design and engineering, equip-
ment fabrication, and supervision of equipment installation.92 Mr. Lim
Poh, head of the Ministry of the Environment's International Environ-
ment and Policy Department, cites experience in design, training, and
management as the main factors establishing Singapore's strong position
for providing international consultancy services.93 These services must
involve overseas projects which earn at least one million Singapore dol-
lars per year.9 4 Eligible companies receive a concessionary twenty per-
cent corporate tax rate, instead of the standard thirty-three percent, for
five years.9" Since 1991, Singapore has negotiated and signed agreements
with the United States, Germany, Japan, and Malaysia to share particu-
lar areas of expertise, 96 promoting Singapore's goal of establishing itself
as a regional center for environmental technology.
86. Environmental Report, supra note 45.
87. Business Report, supra note 31.
88. Id.
89. Singapore Changes How People Think, supra note 54.
90. Waste Power Projects Expand, The Financial Times Ltd., Dec. 3, 1990, avilable in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, AsiaPc File.
91. Id.
92. Business Report, supra note 3 1.
93. Environmental Report, supra note 45.
94. Business Report, supra note 31.
95. Id.
96. See Malaysia-Singapore Panel on Environmental Issues, Xinhua News Service, Feb. 6,
1991; Singapore Government Signs Cooperation Pact With Mitsubishi, Kyodo News Service,
Feb. 27, 1991; US.-Asia Environmental Partnership, Federal News Service, Jan. 4, 1992; Sin.
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C. Regulation of Citizen Behavior
Whereas environmental legislation aimed at industry is deferential,
environmental regulation which targets the average citizen is at times
extremely rigorous. Similarly, while the government has generally
avoided detailed mandates for industry, individual behavior is extensively
regulated. Environmentalists' efforts in this area focus on controlling the
use of private automobiles, restricting waste generation, and educating
the public through numerous campaigns to raise the collective
conscience.
1. Transportation
The most significant piece of legislation regulating individual behav-
ior is the Motor Vehicles (Restricted Zone and Area Licensing) Rules.
97
The Rules comprise a series of specific schemes aimed at counteracting
the rapid growth in the number of motor vehicles per capita due to the
Singaporean population's rising affluence. 98 Engine exhaust composed as
much as two-thirds of the airborne pollutants in Singapore before the
government imposed control measures. 99 The adopled measures regulate
when and where one may drive, dictate the type and quantity of fuel one
may use, and impose exorbitant registration costs.
Rapid growth caused a serious problem with traffic congestion in
the central business district. It became environmentally unacceptable for
more engines to spew exhaust for more hours. The government intro-
duced the Area Licensing Scheme (ALS) under the Motor Vehicles
Rules to attack this problem."° The ALS cordons off the 620 hectare-
wide central business area between 7:15 a.m. and 10:15 a.m., and be-
tween 4:00 p.m. and 5:30 p.m., during weekdays." °" It forbids access to
the restricted zone to all passenger vehicles with a carrying capacity of
less than twelve unless they possess an area license, 1 2 available at con-
venience stores.10 3 To encourage carpooling, the government exempts
gapore, Germany Sign Agreement on the Environment, Xinhua News Service, Nov. 26, 1991;
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AsiaPc File.
97. Chen, supra note 2, at 33.
98. Id.
99. Fukashi Utsunomiya, Environmental Administration in Singapore, in ENVIRONMEN-
TAL POLICIES AND LAWS IN ASIA AND THE WEST PACIFIC REGION 83, 85 (Ichiro Kato et al.
eds., 1981).
100. Id. at 88.
101. Id.
102. Chen, supra note 2, at 33.
103. Economic Sense; Sticky Traffic, Slick Fixes, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1990, at D2.
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vehicles carrying four or more passengers. 104 The Park and Ride Scheme
works with the ALS to relieve congestion. The government provides nu-
merous parking lots on the periphery of the restricted area where com-
muters can park and board a shuttle to major employment areas for a
nominal charge. 105 The combination of these schemes has resulted in a
thirty-five percent reduction in total traffic entering the restricted zone, a
seventy-five percent reduction in private traffic, and a twenty percent in-
crease in speeds in the area." 6 The revenue generated by this scheme
easily covers its administrative costs.10 7 Because of its success, the ALS
currently receives considerable attention in gridlocked United States
cities.
The most significant deterrent to private car travel in Singapore is
the Auto Registration Scheme (ARS). Unlike the ALS, however, impo-
sition of the ARS measures is inconceivable to westerners, who deify the
automobile. Since March 1985, the ARS has assessed a fee of 175 per-
cent of the car's value for the registration of a new automobile, plus an
additional fee of forty-five percent of the car's value for imported
automobiles.108 However, it grants a discount of up to sixty-five percent
for new cars registered as replacements for older cars." 9 Not only does
this incentive promote registration of newer, cleaner-running
automobiles, but it leads to the deregistration of thousands of older
cars.110 The government also levies annual re-registration fees as a "road
tax," determined by a vehicle's engine displacement."1 Owners can sub-
stantially reduce their licensing fees by designating a vehicle as a "week-
end" car, which they may drive only on weekends and between 7 p.m.
and 7 a.m. on weekdays. 12
The government further pursues cleaner air through a policy favor-
ing unleaded fuel. In February 1991, Singapore reformed the petrol tax
to grant unleaded fuel a fifteen cents per litre tax advantage." 3 Motorists
leaving Singapore are also required to fill their tanks at least three-
quarters full, so that they do not buy significantly cheaper, but dirtier,
104. Utsunomiya, supra note 99, at 88.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 89.
107. Id.
108. Business Report, supra note 31.
109. Utsunomiya, supra note 99, at 89.
110. See id.
111. Business Report, supra note 31.
112. Industry, Construction, Transport, Communication Ne .Output, supra note 4.
113. Id.
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leaded fuel in Malaysia. 114 The government imposes a road tax six times
the standard amount imposed on diesel fuel-burning vehicles. 1" These
regulations impose a substantial portion of the emission-control burden
on individuals. Considering that the government does not impose similar
burdens on industry, or require oil tankers in port to employ vapor re-
covery systems, the costs imposed on individuals by -this licensing scheme
are inequitable.' 16 However, this inequity is consistent with Singapore's
general practice of promoting industrial growth at the expense of
individuals.
2. Private Behavior
Some legislation, justified on environmental grounds, borders on the
ridiculous. The government motto could be "just ban it." Already hav-
ing acted to eradicate spitting and to encourage pet owners to clean up
after their animals,117 the government recently targeted as unacceptable
evils unkempt public restrooms and chewing gum." 8
Upon concluding that failure to flush after lavatory use is both un-
healthy and ugly, the government launched a campaign in 1988 to
counteract such "ignorance."' 1 9 Undercover environmental health of-
ficers stationed in public lavatories enforce the campaign by imposing
substantial fines on offenders.' 20 Although the means of enforcement
and the consequences extend far beyond the proportion of the "crime,"
government officials are resolved to force others to comply with their
beliefs. Government officials probably decided the minimal gains in
water preservation realized by infrequent flushing do not outweigh the
need to maintain Singapore's clean image for its tourism industry.
As of December 1991, four out of four Singaporean Parliament
members forbid their constituents to chew gum. They cite litter, health,
and even the disruption of train service caused by jammed doors, as justi-
fications for banning the import, sale, and manufacture of gum.' 2 ' Sin-
gaporean officials undoubtedly relish the absence of a Bill of Rights or
114. Id.
115. Business Report, supra note 31.
116. Singapore Boom, Petroleum Economist, Jan., 1991, at 26, available in LEXIS, Nexig
Library, AsiaPc File.
117. Housing Policies and Politics, Economist Publications Ltd., Mar. 21, 1989, available In
LEXIS, Nexis Library, AsiaPe File.
118. Id.; Singapore Under Gum Law, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1991, at 114.
119. Housing Policies and Politics, supra note 117.
120. Id. Fines of S$200 or more are common. Id. As of November, 1992, one U.S. dollar
is the equivalent of about 1.65 Singapore dollars.
121. Singapore Under Gum Law, supra note 118, at 114.
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political pressure groups when pondering such legislative decisions. Any
enumeration of individual rights in Singapore would likely prevent anti-
gum type laws by permitting opposing groups to create larger freedom
issues out of minor intrusions into individual lifestyles.
Although the government validly objects to certain environmen-
tally-unsound habits of its citizens, the fines levied as enforcement meas-
ures are extreme. However, given that Singapore's cultural tradition
values society over the individual, these seemingly Draconian restrictions
make sense. Regretfully, the global community chooses to emphasize
these measures at the expense of more noteworthy efforts to control pol-
lution previously mentioned.
3. Campaigns
In the same way the government uses incentives to steer industrial
practice, it also launches campaigns to educate and guide the general
public. "Campaigns" are essentially massive marketing operations in
which government enlisted companies employ advanced advertising tech-
niques and catchy slogans to influence public opinion and behavior.' "
These campaigns owe their continued success to traditional tolerance of
paternalism and respect for governmental authority. 123 The ten year old
"green" campaign joined a host of other campaigns, including the
twenty-two year old "Keep Singapore Clean" campaign. Singapore has
launched other campaigns aimed towards increasing marriage and child-
birth, promoting the Chinese language, and being a good neighbor."2 4
In adopting such campaigns, the government quells and manipulates
public dissent in an organized and effective fashion.
The "green" campaign generated tremendous response. Citizens
have formed numerous environmental groups, especially in schools, and
set up the national Council of the Environment, a voluntary, non-govern-
mental organization which coordinates public participation.125 Addi-
tionally, many firms have seized the opportunity to project a positive
public image by sponsoring nature programs, producing books and
videos, and promoting "green" products.126 Recycling and anti-litter
programs excelled and the tree population nearly doubled. 2 7 Perhaps
the actual environmental impact of these campaigns is minimal, but the
122. Singapore Changes How People Think, supra note 54.
123. Chan, supra note 20, at 133.
124. In ASEAN, Growth Comes Before Greenery, supra note 53.
125. Singapore Changes How People Think, supra note 54.
126. Id.
127. In ASEAN, Growth Comes Before Greenery, supra note 53.
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long term effects on heightened individual consciousness could be
significant.
III. ASEAN AND REGIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
CONTROL EFFORTS
Singapore also turns its attention from domestic matters to regional
environmental efforts. For the past twenty-five years, Singapore has been
a charter member of ASEAN which includes Malaysia, Brunei, Thai-
land, the Philippines, and Indonesia. ASEAN was established and for-
malized through the ASEAN Declaration in August 1967.128 As stated
in the ASEAN Declaration, the organization's pu:rpose is to promote
economic and social stability through regional cooperation.1 2 9 In the
area of environmental concerns, Singapore shares few common exper-
iences with the other member nations. Unlike the other members of
ASEAN, Singapore has few remaining natural resou:rces and has avoided
poverty and severe pollution due only to careful planning. Yet Singapore
professes a desire to lead the region in the environmental field, both by
example and through sharing expertise and technology. t3
A. ASEAN Declaration
In the ASEAN Declaration, ASEAN members established a series
of aims and purposes for ASEAN and the machinery necessary to carry
them out. Unfortunately, the parties drafted the ASEAN Declaration
before the rapid development of the 1970s and 1980s, and before the ac-
companying environmental disintegration pierced the collective human
consciousness.
The ASEAN Declaration contains the roots of today's regional en-
vironmental problems because the drafting members lacked the foresight
to treat environmental concerns as an essential component of economic
and social well-being. Instead, the Association pursued economic and
social stability primarily through "active collaboration and mutual assist-
ance on matters of common interest." '131 The Declaration omitted the
environment from its list of "economic, social, cultural, technical, scien-
tific and administrative fields" which the drafters sought to advance.
132
128. The ASEAN Declaration, Aug. 8, 1967, reprinted in MULTILATERAL TREATIES BE-
TWEEN ASEAN CouNTRiEs 14 (Visu Sinnadurai ed., 1986) [hereinafter ASEAN
Declaration].
129. Id.
130. Singapore Government Signs Cooperation Pact With Mitsubishi, supra note 96.
131. ASEAN Declaration, supra note 128.
132. Id.
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To advance these fields, the Declaration provides for an Annual Meeting
of Foreign Ministers, and both standing and ad hoc committees of repre-
sentatives and specialists from each member nation.' 33 However,
although the member nations agree to meet and discuss common goals,
the ASEAN Declaration does little more than provide a forum for such
meetings. It does not formulate specific projects, timetables, or adminis-
trative structures. Furthermore, the members retain control of develop-
ment and regulation at the national level. The Association is bound only
in "friendship and cooperation." '34 Thus, at the time Singapore signed
the ASEAN Declaration, it stood alone in its resolve to pursue environ-
mentally-sound development.
B. Manila Declaration
ASEAN formally recognized the need to address regional environ-
mental issues in the Manila Declaration on the ASEAN Environment,
signed in April 1981.135 The Manila Declaration was the culmination of
four years of meetings by ASEAN expert groups.1 36 The gathering in
Manila focused primarily on conservation of natural resources rather
than regional pollution control. 137 Like the ASEAN Declaration, the
Manila Declaration established priority areas and policy guidelines, but
it accomplished little more than an urging of member nations to consider
the environmental effects of development. 138 It does not impose or sug-
gest any restrictions, and only requires that environmental considerations
be taken into account "as far as practicable."13 9 Although perhaps a
meaningful step for less-developed nations, the Manila Declaration is in-
significant to Singapore, whose domestic legislation and goals far exceed
anything achieved by ASEAN.
C. Singapore Declaration
At the latest ASEAN Summit, in January 1992, Singapore urged the
rest of the region to match its environmental successes. The Singapore
Declaration resulting from the January 1992 summit builds on the Ma-
nila Declaration to strengthen ASEAN's commitment to protect the en-
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Manila Declaration on the ASEAN Environment, Apr. 13, 1981, reprinted in MULTI-
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vironment.' 4 Predictably, economic growth is the main priority, but the
emphasis is on "sustainable development." 141 This principle of sustaina-
ble development promotes growth that survives in the long term despite
accumulated environmental harm. The Singapore Declaration also rec-
ognizes the important role played by non-governmental organizations in
development and encourages their participation in ASEAN. ASEAN
also requested the support of developed countries and expressed a desire
for its environmental commitments to be reflected in the outcome of the
UN Conference on Environment and Development, scheduled for late
1992.142
D. Inadequacies and Self Interest
Clearly, regional pollution control is nonexistent among ASEAN
members. Both the Manila Declaration and the Singapore Declaration,
separated by an eleven-year span, acknowledge the problem of pollution,
but do not provide explicit instructions for bringing about a remedy. Be-
sides attending annual ministerial meetings, neither Singapore nor any
other ASEAN nation is required to take any affirmative steps toward
more effective pollution control. Mere policy guidelines and theoretical
consideration of environmental issues "as far as practicable" 143 are inad-
equate for resolving Southeast Asia's current environmental problems.
Not only is Singapore immune from any regional authority regarding
pollution control, but in many instances Singapore has betrayed regional
environmental interests and its own role as a regional leader by example.
Singapore's rapid development has harmed its neighbors, despite its ex-
pressed concern for their environmental well-being.
A telling example of Singapore's disregard for the effects of its own
growth on the region is illustrated by its development of certain islands
in Indonesia's Riau archipelago. Having nearly exhausted its own supply
of land, Singapore shifted its focus outward for new sites to be used for
industry and tourism." 4 Singapore purchased water to supply these
newly developed areas from Indonesia at the expense of the Indonesian
people, inhibiting their agriculture and their mining operations.'45 Sin-
140. See "Singapore Declaration" Produced at End of ASEAN Summit, Summary of
World Broadcasts (B.B.C.), Jan. 30, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AsiaPc File.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Manila Declaration, supra note 135.
144. See Singapore Seeks to Break Its Confines: Indonesia Is New Investment Site, Interna.
tional Herald Tribune, Nov. 9, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AsiaPc File.
145. Indonesia: Selling Water to Singapore Amid Drought, Inter Press Service, July 13,
1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AsiaPc File.
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gapore did not perform any environmental impact studies to determine
the effects of Riau's development on local water supply.' 46 This callous
attitude could create disastrous consequences in Jakarta and many agri-
cultural regions in Java already in dire need of water due to a long, dry
season and rapid population growth of their own.147 Additionally, when
Singapore selects a site for development, it deprives Indonesia of the op-
portunity to mine millions of tons of unmined bauxite, a potential loss of
many jobs and much revenue. 141 Certainly, Indonesia bears partial re-
sponsibility for its own environmental degradation, but Singapore takes
full advantage of its own wealth and bargaining leverage to seek eco-
nomic gain. For example, Indonesia recently accused Singaporean firms
of dumping toxic waste on Indonesian soil.149 Furthermore, tests show
that air pollution caused by Singapore's offshore oil refineries has signifi-
cantly degraded Indonesia's air quality, but not Singapore's. 1t S Yet be-
cause of its stronger bargaining position, Singapore still avoids preparing
environmental impact studies. As a regional leader, Singapore must as-
sume responsibility for this one-sided planning.
Singapore displays the least concern for regional members' interests
regarding waste disposal. The development of trash incinerators was a
step in the right direction, but not a complete resolution. Singapore's
limited landfill space still lacks the capacity for disposing both
nonincinerable rubbish and incinerable rubbish that exceeds present in-
cinerator capacity.1 51 Rather than supplement its incinerator's waste dis-
posal capacity, Singapore prefers to export its excess waste to other
nations. Private Singaporean companies often ship waste to Thailand,
where it eventually leaks into waters used by the Thais for washing and
cooking.1"2 Viewing such incidents as private affairs between its nation-
als and a foreign sovereign, Singapore hesitates either to assume responsi-
bility for the bad faith disposal efforts of its companies, or to agree to
retrieve private Singaporean waste disposal containers and dispose of
them. 153
Further, Singapore's callous attitude toward the dumping of





150. Utsunomiya, supra note 99, at 85.
151. Waste Power Projects Expand, supra note 90.
152. Asia Pacific" Rfing Concern Over Toxic Waste Dumping, Inter Press Service, May 12,
1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AsiaPc File.
153. Id.
19921
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
fishing industry.15 4 Even state-owned firms have been accused of indis-
criminately dumping large quantities of potentially hazardous waste into
poorer countries in the region.155 Although Singapore's failure to con-
trol its firms or impose sanctions on them does not violate any laws, it
certainly frustrates both the letter and spirit of ASEAN. At the very
least, these events tarnish Singapore's image in the region. Singapore
must exhibit more exemplary behavior and neighborly concern before
ASEAN's member nations will follow its lead or take seriously its stated
desire to lead the region environmentally.
IV. PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS FOR THE NEXT
MASTER PLAN
Although Singapore has progressed significantly in pollution control
since its independence in 1968, room for continued growth remains.
Most of the necessary legislation already exists but needs to be strength-
ened to assure continued progress. Commentators note exhaustively the
present lack of language compelling performance and enforcement.
Strengthening current legislation is not a significant concern of the Sin-
gaporean government for two reasons. First, the need to ensure consis-
tent and faithful governmental attention to environmental goals is
unnecessary in a single party system. Ministers who drafted legislation
and enacted pollution control laws likely anticipated no need for provi-
sions demanding enforcement. Second, given Singaporeans' generally
law-abiding nature and their respect for authority, actual circumvention
of regulations is rare.
The potentially shifting status quo in Singapore, however, creates
enforcement concerns. The effects of a crumbling global financial market
may soon reach Singapore. To combat a declining economy, the govern-
ment may soften industrial regulations and take advantage of statutory
loopholes to boost economic performance. Additionally, as the growing
opposition movement gains governmental power, environmentally un-
friendly views may gain popularity. A simple linguistic change from
"may" to "shall" in the relevant statutory provisions of the Clean Air
and Clean Water Acts and the elimination of the Minister's power to
exempt industry without just cause would promote continued diligence.
On a regional level, Singapore must address its waste disposal prob-
lem, perhaps through membership in the Basel Convention on the Con-
154. See Toxic Waste Threatens Malaysian Environment, The Reuter Library Report, Jan.
15, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AsiaPc File.
155. Southeast Asia: The Filth of Wealth, supra note 3.
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trol of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposal (the Convention), a multinational document drafted in 1989.1 6
Singapore cannot continue locating "dirty" industries in poorer countries
to keep its own backyard clean. The Convention requires international
cooperation, and information-sharing,157 a practice Singapore currently
employs for oil spills and forest fires. 58 Most importantly, the Conven-
tion criminalizes illegal traffic and dumping of hazardous waste without
the host nation's consent,15 9 and requires the exporting nation to re-im-
port the waste if other environmentally sound disposal arrangements
cannot be made."6° The Convention also allows nations willing to accept
hazardous waste to do so,161 permitting Singapore's neighbors to profit
from Singapore's propensity to generate waste. Before allowing other na-
tions to accept Singapore's waste, however, the Basel Convention would
require Singapore to address its waste generation problem, 61 which cur-
rently exceeds the norm for industrialized nations.
Finally, Singapore should begin to value environmental regulation
for the environment's sake. Originally an island covered by tropical rain
forest and bounded by mangrove swamp and coral reefs, Singapore now
is almost entirely developed. Forest covers only slightly more than two
percent of the island, 63 the government largely ignores conservation so-
cieties, and pollution control measures focus on public health, not envi-
ronmental preservation."' Until recently, the government implicitly
approved of Singaporean nationals involved in the illegal trafficking of
endangered animal species. 65 It is too late for Singapore to return to its
pristine state, but it can and should promote environmental preservation
elsewhere in the region through technology-sharing, more environmen-
tally-sound management practices, and promotion of its booming tour-
ism industry.
156. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, U.N. Doe. EP/IG.80/3 (1989) [hereinafter Basel
Convention].
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V. CONCLUSION
One cannot ignore the successes of Singapore's environmental rec-
ord relative to other nations in Southeast Asia, and the world. Certainly
its small size aids its success, but Singapore employs universally essential
principles which other countries might well emulate in the environmental
realm: thoughtful and comprehensive planning, a coherent administra-
tive structure, and public education and participation. The Singaporean
government employs a comprehensive scheme in which it contemplates
and regulates all major aspects of environmental quality, including clean
air and water, thoughtful land use, and incentives to guide business, in-
dustry, and individual conduct. Singapore also strives to promote re-
gional and international environmentalism through ASEAN and its
various declarations. Though "sustainable development" differs from
the common perception of "environmentalism" as wide open spaces and
virgin wilderness, environmental concerns are far more pressing in urban
areas where humanity's deleterious impact is more apparent.
Singapore recognizes that effective environmental protection may
require the restriction of individual liberties, such as the choice of con-
sumer products and transportation habits. Nonetheless, the government
should adopt a more equitable approach toward delegating the burdens
of environmentally conscious development. Industry, whether privately
owned or run by the state, should be subject to mandatory regulations
that cannot be lifted at the discretion of sympathetic government offi-
cials. Furthermore, where environmental strategies are implemented,
they should be done so evenly. For example, having concluded that
clean air and lower emissions are priorities, the government should re-
quire the countless ships in Singapore harbor to employ vapor retrieval
systems for the same reasons it requires private citizens to control their
automobile emissions by purchasing costlier fuels.
Moreover, Singapore should enforce its regulations against offshore
ventures. Efforts to maintain Singapore's image as the "Garden City"
are hampered when "dirty" Singaporean companies are located abroad
or when Singapore exports its waste. Although not as apparent on the
island nation itself, the net effect of Singapore's conduct negatively affects
the environment, tarnishing Singapore's status as a regional leader in en-
vironmental protection efforts. Singapore will lose its credibility in the
less developed and environmentally inferior countries if its deeds do not
match its words.
As it reaches out into the region, Singapore should also be en-
couraged to accept and promote non-development. The Bukit-Timah
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Nature Reserve in Singapore is a good example of a Singaporean's con-
cept of nature. It is really not a "nature reserve" at all, but is well
manicured and covered with benches and paved footpaths-hardly virgin
wilderness. Singaporeans tend to view the environment from a human
perspective rather than from a perspective that satisfies the needs of all of
earth's inhabitants. Their example may be appropriate for urban areas,
but the as yet undeveloped areas may be better served by a hands off
policy which allows mother nature to manage herself without human en-
croachment, whether or not this encroachment is with good intentions.
With Singapore's model of an urban environment, the prospect of exten-
sive displacement of the native landscape of Southeast Asia, one pres-
ently dominated by verdant rainforest outlined by white sand beaches, is
a sad one which must be avoided.
With the worldwide erosion of confidence in Hong Kong's stability
and the growing skepticism toward using Hong Kong as a suitable place
for business and investment, Singapore's attractiveness as a center for
commercial activity continues to increase. However, much of the money
arriving in Singapore belongs to business persons and companies residing
abroad, who have no immediate concerns for preserving Singapore's en-
vironment. The Singaporean government must resist the inevitable pres-
sures that this influx of capital and further development will place on its
environment and must ignore calls for lessened regulation. Giving in to
these pressures will be tragic not only for Singapore, but for the entire
region of Southeast Asia, which Singapore strongly influences. Singa-
pore stands today as a fine example of responsible urban environmental-
ism and will remain an appropriate and viable model for urban
development, so long as development in Southeast Asia is tempered with
restraint and respect for what has already been developed beautifully ac-
cording to nature's model.
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